

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy

MAY, 1931

PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT MAN

Moorhouse F. X. Millar

A Point in Logic

John J. Toohey

Fr. Wasmann's Achievement

R. C. Goodenow

IS McDougall A SCHOLASTIC?

Wm. L. Wade

THE FUTURE OF HUMANISM

Edward Drummond

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY
Saint Louis, Missouri

\$1.00 per year

No. 4

New Editions of Three Outstanding Textbooks

MUNRO

THE GOVERNMENTS of EUROPE

Revised Edition

This latest account of foreign governments and politics mirrors the important changes which have transformed European governmental institutions in the last five years. The changing German government, the Mussolini régime, and the Russian experiment receive particular comment. Developments in France and England are also noted. The final chapter on the framework and functions of the League of Nations is entirely new. For the rest, although the entire book has been rewritten, the original plan has not been changed.

Published in April

BEARD

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT and POLITICS

Sixth Edition

An increased simplicity and vigor of style, achieved by a complete rewriting, and a greater emphasis than before on the function of government mark this new edition. To obtain this emphasis the author has omitted a number of chapters dealing more specifically with history and several passages pertaining to theory, and has borrowed considerable material from *The American Leviathan*. This book will give the student an adequate foundation in both fact and theory for competent citizenship.

Published in April

MUNRO

THE GOVERNMENT of the UNITED STATES

Third Edition

Among the many changes involved in the revision of this book, two new chapters stand out as striking features of the new edition: The initial chapter on *The Study of Government: Why and How*, which gives the student a needed orientation at the start of the course, and the brilliant concluding chapter on the rise of government in the light of American experience, which gives him an opportunity at the end for an interesting and profitable excursion into political philosophy. In general plan the book is similar to the previous editions.

Published in April

60 Fifth Avenue • THE MACMILLAN COMPANY • New York

“Political Theory and Law in Medieval Spain”

By MARIE R. MADDEN, Ph. D.,
Professor of Spanish History and
Political Theory, Fordham University

“Dr. Madden has made an important contribution not only to the history of Spain but to the history of our own Anglo-American legal and political institutions as well. None can fail to recognize the difficulty of the task she has so bravely undertaken, or can question the thoroughness of her achievement. Its importance will best be appreciated by those who are abreast of the more exceptional work being done in the field of legal history. But even the layman in such subjects will find ample ground for edification in a more thorough understanding of constitutional government from a careful study of Dr. Madden’s splendid exposition of the earlier Spanish experiment.”

—From the Foreword by
MOORHOUSE F. X. MILLAR, S. J.,
Chairman, Graduate Faculty of Political
Philosophy, Fordham University.

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY PRESS
233 BROADWAY
NEW YORK

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy

"Entered as second-class matter December 1, 1928, at the post office at St. Louis, Mo., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in section 1103, Act of Oct. 3, 1917, authorized on Jan. 15, 1929."

VOLUME VIII

SAINT LOUIS, MAY, 1931

NUMBER 4

CONTENTS

Philosophy Without Man		Book Reviews:
	Moorhouse F. X. Millar	<i>Scholastic Metaphysics</i>
A Scholastic Scientist.....	Editorial	John F. McCormick, S. J. 76
A Point in Logic.....	John J. Toohey	<i>The Religion of Plato</i> Paul Elmer Moore 77
Fr. Wasmann's Achievement	Robert C. Goodenow	<i>A Monument to Saint Augustine</i> 78
Is McDougall a Scholastic?.....	William L. Wade	<i>An Introduction to Philosophy</i>
The Future of Humanism.....	Edward Drummond	Jaques Maritain 78

PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT MAN

MOORHOUSE F. X. MILLAR,

Chairman Graduate Faculty of Political Philosophy,
Fordham University

THIS article might just as well have been entitled *How the Modern Happens to be Out of His Mind Theoretically*. A review of what would seem to be the trend of present-day thought in France and in England will prove not only striking, but instructive. In France the endeavor of the various schools seems to be concentrating more and more on a philosophical recovery of objective reality, from which the French mind had been characteristically inhibited as a result of Montaigne's early initiation of the Stoic "cult of the ego" and by Descartes' mathematically "clear and distinct idea". In England, on the contrary, the drift in thought appears to be toward a rediscovery of an active principle of knowledge and an assertion of man's freedom from those "laws of nature" to which theoretically he was supposed to be reduced in consequence of the denial by Locke and Hume of the intelligibility of things and of the spiritual faculty of intelligence in man.

To bear out the contrast I have in mind, the two following statements will serve to illustrate my meaning. Thomas H. Green, the English philosopher, in his *Prolegomena to Ethics*, asserts:

To say that man in himself is *in part* an animal or product of nature, on the ground that the consciousness which distinguishes him is realized through natural processes, is not more true than to say that an animal is in part a machine, because the life which distinguishes it has mechanical structures for its organs. If that activity of knowledge on the part of man, to which functions provisionally called natural are organic, is as absolutely different from any process of change or becoming as we have endeavored to show that it is, then even the functions organic to it are not described with full truth when they are said to be natural.

Let this be compared with Alfred Fouillée's formulation of the development of French idealism set forth in his book, *Le mouvement idéaliste et la réaction contre la science positive*, where he states in summary:

Contemporary idealism admits that the richer reality is in superior, and therefore intellectual, moral, and social determinations, the more it opens out on universal life. With the increase in internal complexity of a being there will be a corresponding proportional increase in its external relations. We can therefore say that the more comprehensive its subjectivity, the more extensive will be its objectivity. The idea is not a mere residue of abstraction, it is a manifestation of higher realities. Its very conception already implies a conscious

co-operation with the eternal achievement. While appearing to construct a purely intelligible world we are on our part constructing and enriching a world of reality.

For all the difference in tenor and direction between these two passages, they accord in indicating a common reaction to positivism. But in either case they agree in not meeting the problem with which positivism was confronted or in solving the problem to which positivism failed to find the answer. It must be remembered that positivism as Comte saw it offered the only solid basis for social reorganization in the face of what he considered the consequences of the Renaissance and the Reformation, which he characterized as Protestantism or "an increasing and more and more methodical protest against the intellectual bases of the ancient social order, further extended by a necessary consequence of its absolute nature to every true organization whatsoever."

Comte had witnessed and bears testimony to the disintegrating influence of the doctrine of private judgment and of the rationalistic individualism of the "*philosophes*" as well as to the anarchical consequences of Rousseau's *Contrat Social*. He beheld the fulfillment of the prophecy made by Burke, who, when alluding to Dr. Price and the dissenting element in England, insisted:

This sort of people are so taken up with their theories about the rights of man, that they have totally forgotten his nature. Without opening up one new avenue to the understanding, they have succeeded in stopping up those leading to the heart. They have perverted in themselves, and in those who attend them, all the well-placed sympathies of the human breast.

But instead of reverting to the traditional conception and appreciation of human nature advocated by Burke, Comte took up with what Condorcet had held to be the discovery of the science of human nature made by Locke. On the strength of Locke's sensism Condorcet supplied him with the ground for his science of sociology in declaring that "The sole ground of faith in the natural sciences is this idea, that the general laws, known or unknown, that rule the phenomena of the universe, are necessary and constant; and on what grounds would this principle be less true for the development of the intellectual and moral faculties of man, than for the other operations of nature?" Reviewing the whole trend of this positive science of sociology in our own day, the young English writer, Lawrence Hyde, writing for the *Atlantic Monthly* (August '30, p. 250) under the title, *Can Science Control Life?*, has this to say, "It is difficult to explain the tremendous appeal which detached, dispassionate research in this field is making to so many thousands of minds today except by the fact that it appears to offer us all a way of solving our problems without being compelled to self-discipline." As he points out, very truly, I think, in a previous paragraph:

The pre-occupation of the sociologist with concrete and objective facts, his pronounced indifference to finer spiritual values, his conscientiously maintained attitude of detachment even in those connections where detachment is only too obviously misplaced, the lifeless and insipid style in which he is prone to express himself, his marked reluctance to recognize

the psychological basis of his own reasoning—all these suggest that what we have to do with is not a positive, but rather a negative, attitude to experience.

Now it is largely by way of a reaction from this negative attitude towards experience that idealism, with its insistence upon the spiritual, the intellectual, and the active, is making its appeal. The first answer that suggests itself to the Scholastic is of course that both the sensist and the idealist are wrong in that they deny the value and function of the concept either as the intelligent conception of something or as a thing intelligibly conceived. The one refuses to look within his own mind for the *why* of thought, the other denies the possibility of its assimilating itself to anything other than itself. But the difficulty, I think, lies somewhat deeper, as may be illustrated by considering idealism in one of its latest phases, namely, that of the French Jewish philosopher Léon Brunschvicg. In the following passage it may be noted that he has managed to combine what at the start we saw to be Fouillée's effort to produce reality from the recesses of thought exclusively, together with Green's flight from the 'natural'. He says:

Idealism derives all its fruitfulness from being defined as a doctrine of the living mind. If it is true that the human intellect is a spontaneous activity, that its first steps are unconscious, and that man must advance slowly in the conquest of his own mind, it is to science that he looks to prepare and to measure the stages of his conquest. The intellectual power of man is developed in his perpetual contact with the phenomena of nature, in the effort put forth to assemble the incoherent multiplicity of sensible facts in the harmony of rational agreement; the mind reveals itself in science. The constitutive categories, in place of allowing an *a priori* deduction which precedes science and which dispenses with it in case of need, appear as the term of scientific reflection, and all progress in the knowledge and determination of the mind is bound up with a progress of science. (*L'idealisme contemporain*, p. 176.)

Commenting on Brunschvicg's theory of idealism, D. Parodi, in his recent book, *Du positivisme à l'idéalisme*, makes the following very enlightening criticism:

M. Brunschvicg, in his unwillingness that reason or mind, for fear of becoming materialized and in some manner enslaved to themselves, should have a fixed "nature" or "constitution," dislikes nothing so much as attributing to them an interior law, a necessary continuity of effort, or all that the systems of categories of all times have attempted to hand down, perhaps more or less awkwardly. But in view of his assumptions can we truly speak of the *progress* of reason and of thought? And do we not finally fall back to a sort of "becoming" of this same judgment and intelligence, analogous, though from another angle, to the Heraclitean or Bergsonian flux of nature or of consciousness? Are we not condemned to some sort of mobility of pure thought, and to an unintelligibility of the intellect?

Now why all this Manichaean fear of our inevitable and fundamental human nature? In this connection it should not be forgotten that Kant, by denying the basic and essential goodness of human nature in its intrinsic determination to happiness, undermined in his theory all possibility of ethics.

Certainly for all their apparent tolerance modern phi-
Continued on page 76

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

Published Quarterly from November to May by the Jesuit
Students of the School of Philosophy and Science of
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY

SAINT LOUIS, MISSOURI



JOSEPH E. BOLAND, *Editor*

Associate Editors

ALOIS M. RIECKUS	JEROME H. GIBSON
MICHAEL V. MURRAY	ROBERT C. HARTNETT
EARL L. DIETER	CORNELIUS P. FORD

Corresponding Editors

CHARLES KEENAN School of Philosophy Mount St. Michael's Gonzaga University Spokane, Washington,	BENJAMIN L. MASSE School of Philosophy L'Immaculée Conception 1855 Rue Rachel Est Montreal, Canada
MARION R. BATSON School of Philosophy Sacred Heart College Shembaganur, India	THOMAS J. STEMPER School of Philosophy St. Helier Jersey, England
HUGO GERLEMAN Gregorian University Via del Seminario, 120 Rome, Italy	GEORGE A. MORGAN School of Philosophy Weston College Weston, Massachusetts

WILLIAM DEVLIN. Milford School of Philosophy St. Xavier College Milford, Ohio
--

25c per copy

\$1.00 per year

A Scholastic Scientist

A GREAT soldier has gone forth from amongst us, and it seems peculiarly fitting that a magazine such as this should do him honor. Eric Wasmann stands before the modern philosophical world as a testimony and a proof. A testimony he is to the perennial youth of Scholasticism, and a proof that science does not war against science nor truth contradict truth. In a day whose watchword is science, when that only is believed which can quote experiment and rattle off statistics, this German Jesuit has met the adversaries on their own ground and has defeated them. He was a thorough scholastic and a thorough scientist. He never doubted the worth and the need of metaphysics in a world of chaotic thought, but he did not despise the mastery of factual knowledge. There was a time when Scholasticism went to seed because certain of its followers lost contact with reality and gave themselves over to refinement and subtlety. This was an excess and it brought a very correct system into an altogether too general disrepute. But the sin of the modern pseudoscientist is a greater and more fatal one. Far from relying too much on the power of abstract reasoning he denies it any influence even in its most proper field. He deals with facts, living facts, which he can see and feel and test

by every sense. And too often he comes to believe that what he can not see and feel does not exist or can have no just claim on the attention of any who would call himself a philosopher. This, too, is an excess and has its fruit in bold unsupported statements and sweeping denials which go strong against the grain of common sense. Obviously the more correct way is that which gives to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, which listens to the explorer of fact when he speaks with certain knowledge, but subjects all hypotheses and theories to the rigid test of the laws of thought.

Along such a way went Eric Wasmann. Thrown by accident into a study which was decidedly interesting to him, he became a master in it. Later he broadened his field of activity and entered what we may well consider, from a philosophical point of view, his life work. He is known as perhaps the greatest authority on ant life and ant guests, but his claim to our attention is the work he has done on the battle ground of evolution. There if anywhere are needed the two qualifications of sure factual knowledge and correct thinking, and because he had both of these Eric Wasmann has done yeoman's work for the cause of truth.

His knowledge and his mental capacity would have profited the world very little indeed had he kept it all to himself. But his twenty-seven books and numerous treatises give evidence of an absorbing interest and a tireless energy which made his frail body an instrument of tremendous service. And so because he preached and practiced the union of science and philosophy, because his mind was broad enough to comprehend the realms of both and sharp enough to see where each could go its own way, and where each depended upon the other, and because he gave the world the fruit of his labors we honor him. Scholasticism has need of many such.

TO STUDY SUAREZ

The subject chosen for this year's symposium of the Missouri Province Philosophical Association is the works of Suarez. The convention will be held on August 19th and 20th, at Loyola University, Chicago. A conspectus of the life, writings, and bibliography of the Spanish philosopher will be given. Of his metaphysics, the plan is to make special treatment of the Suarezian modes, teaching on matter and form, and on individuation. Rev. George H. Mahowald, of Loyola University, will speak on the *De Anima*, and Rev. Vincent Kelly, of Marquette University, on the Political Theory of Suarez, a particularly fruitful field of study in view of the re-examination of the American political system which the Washington Bicentenary is likely to occasion. The precise subjects to be treated in other papers have not yet been settled.

A POINT IN LOGIC

JOHN J. TOOHEY

Georgetown University, Washington, D. C.

PERHAPS the readers of the *Modern Schoolman* will be interested in a question which has to do with a doctrine commonly taught in textbooks of Logic. It is a question I have discussed several times both in public and in private; but I suppose many readers of the *Modern Schoolman* have never heard of the discussion. The question relates to the consistency of a particular doctrine.

It is the very function and aim of the teacher of Logic to instil into the minds of his pupils a habit of consistency. Consequently, the least we may expect of him is that any doctrine he puts forth with this object in view shall be consistent with itself and with the rest of his teaching. Let us see, then, whether this expectation is fulfilled as regards the doctrine of the distributed and undistributed predicate.

The doctrine is this: first, that the predicate of an affirmative proposition is undistributed, i. e., taken in part of its extension, and the predicate of a negative proposition is distributed, i. e., taken in its full extension; secondly, that a proposition containing a distributed term cannot be derived from a proposition or a set of propositions in which that term is undistributed. It is mainly with the second part of the doctrine that I am concerned in this paper.

If we take the proposition, *All S is P*, and submit it to the processes of obversion and conversion, we can obtain the Partial Inverse, *Some non-S is not P*; that is to say, by means of obversion and conversion a proposition in which *P* is distributed may be derived from a proposition in which *P* is undistributed. We are, therefore, faced with these alternatives: either obversion and conversion (one or both) are invalid processes or the doctrine of the distributed and undistributed predicate is unsound. Now, it is admitted on all hands that obversion and conversion are valid processes.¹ In fact, their validity is presupposed by the doctrine of the distributed and undistributed predicate; for this doctrine was devised in order to facilitate the management of these and cognate processes.

That is the problem which I proposed and developed in the first edition of my *Elementary Handbook of Logic*. It brought me into controversy with teachers of Logic in the United States and in Europe. I met only one or two persons, and that in private conversation, who claimed that the Partial Inverse is invalid on the ground that it is inconsistent with the doctrine of the distributed and undistributed predicate. To make that claim was of course to beg the question; for the soundness of the doctrine was the very thing I challenged. And besides, to condemn the

¹The conversion of the O proposition must, of course, be excepted from this statement.

Partial Inverse is *ipso facto* to condemn the processes of conversion and obversion. For the most part, those who engaged in the discussion attempted to reconcile the doctrine with the Partial Inverse. The arguments they used and my answers to them I afterwards summarized and inserted in the Appendix of the second edition of my *Handbook*, which appeared in 1924.

After the controversy had proceeded for some time in public print and in private correspondence, I put the following question, which goes to the root of the whole matter: *Does a proposition with a distributed predicate term give information about more individuals in the extension of the predicate term than does a proposition with an undistributed predicate term?* If this question is answered in the affirmative, the Partial Inverse of *All S is P* is invalid, in spite of whatever device we may employ to justify it; and if it is invalid, obversion and conversion are illicit processes; for it was by means of obversion and conversion that we obtained the Partial Inverse. If the question is answered in the negative, then it is obviously inadequate and misleading to pronounce a given conclusion in O invalid on the sole ground that the term in its predicate is distributed after being undistributed in the premises. Why shouldn't it be distributed if the mere fact of its being distributed conveys no information about it?²

All categorical propositions give information directly about their subject; and all of them, except the O proposition, give information indirectly about their predicate; that is, they give it by implication. The particular negative proposition gives no information whatever about its predicate; by this I mean that it gives no information about any individuals in the extension of its predicate. To illustrate this point, let us set down the following propositions:

- B All Hottentots are honest
- C No Hottentots are honest
- D Some Hottentots are honest
- F Some Hottentots are not honest

If Mr. Jones is certain of any one of these propositions, he knows something about Hottentots in terms of honesty, and he is able to some extent to check the statements of another man about their honesty. But if he does not know which of the propositions is true, he knows nothing about Hottentots in terms of honesty. Suppose that he knows that Hottentots are a brown people who live in Africa and that this is the limit of his knowledge concerning them. He knows from experience that the fol-

²I have used the words "distributed" and "undistributed," though I do not consider them accurate. But I could not avoid them without a continual repetition of qualifying phrases.

lowing proposition is true: "Some honest men are not Hottentots". Now, this proposition remains true, no matter which of the propositions, B, C, D, or F, is true; it gives Mr. Jones no information as to which of them is true. Therefore, the proposition "Some honest men are not Hottentots", gives no information about Hottentots in terms of honesty; and if it does not give this information, then it gives no information whatever about Hottentots. Whatever information Mr. Jones may have about Hottentots he has independently of this proposition. Consequently, the particular negative proposition gives no information about its predicate, in spite of the fact that the predicate is called distributed. This being so, let us ask again: Why shouldn't the predicate of an O proposition in any conclusion be distributed, so long as the mere fact of its being distributed conveys no information about it?

As an example of an invalid syllogism, it is common to cite the following: *All M is P, Some S is not M*, therefore *Some S is not P*. The reason usually offered for the invalidity of this argument is that P is distributed in the conclusion, whereas it is undistributed in the major premise. The assignment of such a reason would lead one to believe that there is more information about P contained

in the conclusion than in the major premise. As a matter of fact, the major premise contains more information about P than the conclusion does. The major premise gives us indirectly some information about P in terms of M,—viz. *Some P is M*,—but the conclusion does not give us any information about P in terms of anything. The conclusion is invalid, not because it contains any information about P, but because it implies something which is not implied in the premises. The conclusion implies that *All S is P* is false, and in the premises there is no such implication. For example, the premises, *All men are mortal, Some animals are not men*, do not imply that *All animals are mortal* is false; but the conclusion, *Some animals are not mortal*, does imply this; and that is why the conclusion is invalid. Another way of putting it is to say the syllogism is invalid because a negative minor premise is forbidden in the First Figure.

If, then, we pronounce any conclusion in O invalid on the ground that its predicate is distributed, we shall have to pronounce the Partial Inverse of *All S is P* invalid on the same ground; and that will compel us to hold that obversion and conversion are illicit processes—unless we are content to be inconsistent.

FR. WASMANN'S ACHIEVEMENT

ROBERT C. GOODENOW

St. Louis University

IN the passing of Fr. Wasmann on the ninth of March of this year we lost a Catholic scientist who during his life was not satisfied with being merely a scientist *and* a Catholic. He welded his scientific knowledge, his philosophic principles, and his Catholic faith so thoroughly that they were no longer three truths, but one great truth.

Father Eric Wasmann was born at Meran, a small health resort in the Tyrolese, on May 29, 1859. His father, who was a convert, had moved there from Hamburg. After entering the Jesuit Novitiate at the age of sixteen, Eric followed the usual course of studies until the end of his philosophical course, when sickness took him away from regular classes. His superior sent him to the Novitiate at Exaeten, Holland, to regain his health. When he reached Exaeten, his palid countenance and frail body and the occurrence of frequent hemorrhages seemed to prophesy a speedy death for the young cleric. The Father Rector, who was something of a doctor, put him on a special diet and the young scholastic, much to the surprise of everyone, began to recover. He was soon allowed to take recreation with the novices, who admired and enjoyed his sunny disposition, his quick wit and lively tongue. Even then his talents were recognized and he was known to be a clear thinker with an unfailing memory. They were convinced that he never had to study,

for he seemed to remember everything he read.

It was at this time that he began to study ants. The novices used to accompany him on their walks and help him to find ant hills. The country around Exaeten was rather level, with sandy soil, and the uncultivated portions were covered with scrubby fir trees. Wasmann, right from the beginning, took an interest in the guests of ants. So on their walks the novices would frequently take a screen with them. After tying up the bottoms of their trousers to keep the ants from crawling up their legs and biting them, they would sift the ant hill while the young scientist would pick the guests off the screen. In his room back at the Novitiate he had a number of ant hills under glass for special observation. It was the beginning of a life-long study.

With Father Wasmann one can do more than point out his great contributions to science, his world-wide renown as an entomologist—an expert in the study of insects. All these are worthy of note, but it will not be for these alone that Father Wasmann will be remembered, even in strictly scientific circles.

He took an active part in attempting to remove the popular misunderstanding of the relation of the Church to Science and particularly to Evolution, which at that time seemed to be Science's latest weapon against the

Church. For the last thirty years of his life, the removal of these misconceptions and false ideas concerning the Church's position occupied a large part of his time.

He was qualified for this work as few of our Catholic scientists have been. There can be no doubt that he recognized his opportunities if we consider the frequency with which he lectured and the spirit in which he wrote his books and articles. In the first place, he was a scientist who had won his way to the top of his field. As an entomologist and particularly as an authority on ant-guests, we find him internationally recognized. It is the fact that he so frequently wrote and lectured with the purpose of giving an adequate expression of the Catholic view that opened the eyes of the zoologists of that day to the realization that the Church and Science were not continually at swords-points, and that the theory of evolution considered as a scientific hypothesis was not opposed to Catholic dogma.

In 1907, he made the position of theistic evolution clear by stating what its postulates were: the fact of a Creator and the act of creation, the subjection of the universe to the law of cosmic and inorganic evolution; *conditionally*, until science should prove it possible, the absence of spontaneous generation; the laying down of the earliest laws for the evolution of the organic world at the production of the earliest forms; and the exclusion of man's spiritual soul from the realm of things produced by evolution. He himself thought that the genetic development of many insects, especially those that dwell with ants and termites as "guests", and have adapted themselves in many ways to their hosts, could be conveniently explained only by the theory of evolution, with considerable probability from indirect proof. He regarded the actual proofs brought forward to substantiate the evolution of man's body as inadequate, especially in respect to paleontology; although of itself, as a theoretic possibility, that method of producing the physical part of man was open to the Creator.

On the merits of his lectures and writings he gained a hearing from even his most eminent and uncompromising foes. Some criticized his arguments in periodicals, others met him on the public platform. Among the latter were Dr. Juliusburger, Dr. Friedenthal, and Dr. Schmidt, Haeckel's assistant. Big scientists of the stamp of William Waldeyer and Oskar Hertwig received him impartially, even became his friends. His data was too irrefutable, his reasoning too cogent, his character too winning for them to ignore. Five hundred newspaper articles were written on the Berlin Lectures and discussion, leaving no room for doubt but that the public, too, was alive to the worth of this man.

In an article of this length a complete and just appraisal of his contributions to the scientific knowledge of ants, termites, and inquilines (ant-guests) is quite impossible. Some idea, however, of the extensiveness of his studies and investigations can be suggested. For over thirty years he was an outstanding figure in the field of entomology, but

his chief accomplishments were made in the special study of inquilines. Up until 1928 there was a record of over three hundred treatises of his on ants and termites, some of these numbering from one hundred to two hundred pages. From his observations of the colonies of ants as he found them in the open country, or from his experiments with the colonies which he had living under glass in his laboratory, and by means of staining and microphotography, he acquired a thorough knowledge of their biology and anatomy, their racial history and mode of living, their habits and their instincts.

In much the same manner he studied the guests of ants and termites, investigating how they happen to be living among the ants, their development under their new surroundings, the changes in their physical characteristics and mode of living. The facts and scientific data which he acquired, the systemization and classification of this wealth of material, the generalizations he made from it, are to be had only from an examination of his writings and lectures. These began coming from his pen as early as 1891, and continued to appear until his death.

The special attention that he gave to the psychic capabilities of ants made him well known as an animal psychologist. It is hard to say whether the relation of insect behaviour to animal psychology was the chief object in the mind of Father Wasmann while studying the activities of ants, but certainly it has become a very important part of his work. Two of his works on ant psychology have been translated into English: *Instinct and Intelligence in the Animal Kingdom* and *The Psychology of Ants and Higher Animals*. These books are most helpful to students of psychology. Still, to judge Father Wasmann's contributions to animal psychology from these two small works written in a popular style would be entirely misleading, for the more exacting scientific treatises were written and delivered chiefly for professional zoologists and have never been translated into English. But for anyone to study animal psychology without knowledge of and reference to his extensive work on this subject would be to lose the results of one of the most thorough investigators and to lack the assistance of the critical judgment of one who worked unhampered by mechanistic bias and monistic postulates.

Of his intimate knowledge of subjects which were outside but allied to his specialty we can only surmise. From his lectures we can gather that in the fields of paleontology, anthropology, phylogeny, and general biology, he was so well informed that his opponents, although they were specialists, could not argue against his criticism and evaluation of the latest discoveries in their own fields.

Nor is it to be expected that one whose studies were so exhaustive and whose writings were so numerous was to be left for long unrecognized in zoological circles. In 1911 the Entomological Society of London elected him an honorary fellow. This was but one of twenty societies which conferred on him a like honor.

We can understand something of the completeness which placed his scientific knowledge on such a high, scholarly level from an explanation he himself gives of the methods he used in the study of the anatomy, development and biology of the *Termitoxenia* (an extremely minute fly which is the guest of certain ants found in India and Africa). "What," he asks, "is the source of the scientific evidence? Have observations been made in India and Africa regarding the habits of these diminutive creatures, and has their development been studied for years in artificial nests of termites? By no means. . . . The inquilines and their hosts were sent to me in alcohol or formal. The account is based on the results obtained by modern methods of using stains and cutting sections. The series of sections of *Termitoxenia* supply us with material for studying its anatomy, development, and biology. So far I have obtained by means of the microtome complete series of sections of sixty specimens of five species of *Termitoxenidae* of various ages. The total number of sections thus prepared amounts to 10,000."¹ And again to ascertain why ants took such evident delight in licking their "true inquilines," he prepared in the course of ten years about 20,000 sections of various kinds of inquilines among ants and termites, studying their tissue under the microscope.

But Father Wasmann was more than an eminent scientist, he was a Catholic scientist. A single glance at his controversial writings, his lectures and popular books, will make this clear. At the very beginning of his studies, monism was rampant in Europe and especially in Germany. Most of the zoologists of the time were monists, and were using their scientific knowledge as a weapon against Catholicism and theism in general. Haeckel had from the beginning been using the theory of Evolution as a battering ram against Christianity. The spirit of controversy is much more lively in Europe than here in the United States, and Father Wasmann, although he never allowed himself to be involved in personal controversy, was yet most energetic in explaining scholastic principles and in exposing the doctrines and postulates of the monists.

The beginning of the campaign against monism might be said to date from 1901, for in that year he began publishing a series of articles on the Theory of Evolution in the *Stimmen aus Maria-Lach*. This does not mean he was silent on this subject before, for we have evidence to the contrary. But at this time his attack seems to have become more pointed. These articles were later, in 1905, embodied in his book *Modern Biology and the Theory of Evolution*.

At this time also he began giving his lectures on the Theory of Evolution to various Catholic universities and groups of Catholic scientists. He received invitations from colleges in Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Belgium, and Holland. Within the next twenty years he was to deliver

¹ *Modern Biology and the Theory of Evolution* (English Version) p. 41.

more than a hundred lectures on the relation of Science to Philosophy and Theology, with special reference to the Theory of Evolution.

In addition to these lectures he published several works directed chiefly against monism. The 1928 edition of the German *Who's Who* lists twenty-seven of his works, and of these seven are on this subject. Three of these have been translated into English. *Modern Biology and the Theory of Evolution* is a book which indicates in a general way the range and depth of Father Wasmann's knowledge, both in his own special field and in other branches of science. He has made the treatment suitable for those who lack expert knowledge in scientific matters. *The Problem of Evolution* contains the three lectures on the Theory of Evolution, its relation to philosophy and theology, and its application to man, which Father Wasmann gave before a group of German scientists in Berlin in February, 1907. A summary of the discussion which took place on the fourth evening, together with Father Wasmann's brief reply to the objections of his opponents, follows the text of the three lectures. The lectures, on Father Wasmann's part, were intended to clarify the many obscure ideas regarding evolution, to show in what light these ideas were to be regarded, and what was the correct attitude towards them. His opponents it was who injected religious controversy into the evening's discussion.

In the third work, *Christian Monism*, Father Wasmann leaves the realm of science and shows that true monism is to be found only in Christianity. In his preface he writes:

"Would that all devout believers might gain deeper insight into the precious content of these Christian mysteries, in order thence to draw fresh nourishment for their god-like and supernatural life! Would that the whole splendour of the Christian idea of God, with its connotation of immanence and likeness, were triumphantly grasped by all educated Catholics whom monistic catch-words flatter and allure! Since the great World War the monistic conception of the world is beginning on all sides to revive its anti-Christian propaganda. All the more necessary does it become for us to arm ourselves against it by a deeper understanding of our holy faith. And this is the object of the considerations here presented." This little book throws a light on one side of Father Wasmann's life about which little is heard, namely, his spiritual aspirations.

To some visitors who were expressing their admiration at the beauty of his large collection of ants and beetles he made this reply: "I do my service as a scientist for Christ; for love of Him I make the smallest things as beautiful as possible; I dare not offer Him anything mediocre."

On the occasion of his seventieth birthday, May 29, 1929, throughout Europe there was a general acknowledgment by scientific men of his valuable work. The convention of German Entomologists in their opening meeting of the year paid tribute to Father Wasmann. The

handsome volume of three hundred and sixty-five pages published in his memory and presented to him was most pleasing to him. It contained thirty-one scientific treatises with a short biographical sketch. The fact that scholars from over sixteen nations in various parts of the world contributed, among whom were some of his opponents, is an evident sign of the extent to which Father Wassmann succeeded in becoming all things to all men. I do

not believe I can close this brief article more fittingly than by quoting the motto which was inscribed in this volume:

To the Man as a Token of Greeting;
To the Champion as a Token of Honor;
To the Student as a Token of Gratitude;
To the Teacher as a Token of Love;
To the Friend as a Token of Fidelity;
To the Opponent as a Token of Esteem.

IS McDougall A SCHOLASTIC?

WILLIAM M. WADE

St. Louis University

There are two ways of approaching any philosophical problem. We may ask whether a thing exists or we may ask what its nature is. A century ago the question "whether" was more frequently asked. Everyone took it for granted that everyone else knew the meaning of the terms. Today, however, it is the question "what" that is in the limelight. This shifting of the problem has deceived many students of philosophy. They read a panegyric on God, or on the soul, or on free will, written by one of the moderns, and at once proclaim from the housetops that the writer is a convert to traditional philosophy. Because of a lack of thoroughness they fail to recognize that the so-called convert does not mean the same thing they do, although he uses the same terms. They would be horrified if you told them that their modern friend did not properly believe in God, the soul, or free will, at all, but had some vague and false notion which he denoted by these words.

The battle against the greatest enemy of free will and true morality, materialistic determinism and nineteenth century science, has been a long and weary struggle. At times it seemed almost hopeless to oppose such a powerful foe, but with the turn of the century came the turn in the tide of battle. Since then, materialistic science has been fighting a rear-guard retreat, yielding, however grudgingly, one stronghold after another, until today the crude materialism of the last century has become a term of reproach and only dares to show its head under the form of naturalism. But the battle is not over. Free will, as testified to by consciousness and common sense, has by no means been universally vindicated. When science, in the face of incontrovertible facts, yielded her materialistic stronghold, she did not withdraw from the field. Rather she feigned retreat to deceive her opponents, and her tactics seem to have succeeded. "What is not so generally realized is that the attack upon free will, repelled so far as the scientists are concerned, has been renewed in a more insidious and dangerous form by the exponents of modern psychology. There are prevalent today a number of tendencies in psychology, which, however they may differ among themselves, issue, nevertheless, in a position of common antag-

onism to free will."¹ The determinists have shifted the problem by conceding an affirmative answer to the question, "Is there a free will?" and denying the traditional answer to the question, "What is free will?". Many who could easily detect the fallacy in crude materialism, have been taken in by camouflaged materialism.

The most outstanding example of this is the vitalistic theory of Professor McDougall. I know that many people will doubt my statement when I say that Professor McDougall denies the soul and free will. The Reverend Franz De Hovre in his excellent book, *Philosophy and Education*, speaking of the importance of the immortality of the soul in any philosophy of education, says of McDougall:

"One of the best known of modern psychologists, William McDougall, . . . gives expression to his conviction as follows: 'I am aware that to many minds it must appear nothing short of a scandal that anyone occupying a position in an academy of learning other than a Roman Catholic seminary, should in this twentieth century defend the old-world notion of the soul of men . . .'. Thus it is admitted once more as a point of doctrine of psychology that man is a child of eternity."²

Father De Hovre seems to think that McDougall believes in the traditional concept of the soul. I am afraid that Father De Hovre, and many others with him, have been deceived by the shifting of the problem, if they mean to say that McDougall believes in the soul as traditionally conceived. Either they have not read a sufficient amount of his writings to fully grasp the import of his philosophy, or they have not followed his principles to their logical conclusions. It would indeed be a scandal if anyone were to teach McDougall's concept of the soul and free will in a Catholic seminary.

It is evident to anyone who has read McDougall's *Body and Mind* and his article in *Behaviorism—A Battle Line*, why scholastic philosophers, weary of the struggle against materialism, should be tempted to accept McDougall too whole-heartedly and rejoice over the new

¹ C. E. M. Joad, *End of Ethics*, Harpers, Aug., 1927.

² De Hovre, *Education & Philosophy*, p. 41.

convert. His consistent, vigorous opposition to materialism, mechanism, and behaviorism, under whatever form they have dared to appear, is music in the ears of the scholastic. His arguments, if followed to their logical conclusions, would prove the traditional concept of the soul. His method of reasoning is excellent; he does not hesitate to use a syllogism; nothing is so abominable in his eyes as the modern habit of never defining terms or of defining them loosely and indefinitely. There is a sincerity and fair-mindedness joined with a professorial dogmatism in his writings that makes an appeal to the student of philosophy. He does not fear to list all of the most difficult objections to his theory, and he never deliberately side-steps. Often he candidly admits that his answers are not completely satisfactory.³ These are the qualities, so rare in most of the modern philosophical writers, which have caused many scholastics to misinterpret McDougall's philosophy; whereas in reality, McDougall, though he has rejected Materialism, has a long way to go before he admits the cardinal principles of scholastic philosophy.

I do not wish in any way to belittle his philosophical writings, or to cast aspersions on the man himself. He has well earned his reputation as the foremost psychologist of the day. I have always admired his books, and have benefited greatly by every one of them that I have read. His *Body and Mind* should, I think, be read by every student of rational psychology. His sincerity seems to be beyond question. His clear and fearless expression of his philosophical conclusions is admirable and by his writings he has done much to explode the nineteenth century Materialism. But I am convinced that his theory of instincts, which he has so tenaciously defended, logically denies free will as commonly understood by men, and destroys the basis of all true morality, as I shall attempt to point out in this paper. I am also convinced that the soul, whose existence he proves, is not the traditional concept of the soul, but a material soul; something like the "anima belluina" of the scholastics, though I shall waive that question for the present.

In 1907 McDougall published his *Introduction to Social Psychology*, in which for the first time he set forth the *hormic theory of human actions*, which is his answer to the question that has vexed philosophers from the time of Thales to the last of the moderns—Why do we act the way we do? "The view that all animal and human behavior is purposive in however vague and lowly a degree, and that purposive action is fundamentally different from mechanical processes, may conveniently be called the Hormic theory."⁴ The basic principle of the theory is that the source of all striving in living beings, men not excepted, is the instincts, and every action is ultimately reducible to an instinctive impulse.

⁴ *Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 72.

³ c.f. *Introduction to "Body and Mind," or "Behaviorism—A Battle Line."*

"We may say, then, that directly or indirectly, the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity; by the conative or impulse force of some instinct . . . every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along toward its end, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained. . . These impulses are the mental forces that maintain and shape all the life of individuals and societies and in them we are confronted with the central mystery of all life and mind and will."⁵

McDougall's theory has enjoyed a widespread popularity. Gardner Murphy says: "Enthusiasm for it spread like wildfire. Not only was it largely influential as a textbook, but its conception was copied and extended right and left by both social theorists and educators. The doctrine became the guiding concept for many to whom psychology had been an untrdden field."⁶ I do not propose to go into the intricacies of this theory, but merely to show, by explaining the cardinal principles of the theory, that it leads logically to the denial of free will. I shall confine myself to his doctrine concerning the nature of instincts and the manner in which instinctive behavior is modified until it culminates in the moral actions of men and the formation of character.

An instinct is "an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class; to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner or at least to experience an impulse to such action."⁷ We may compare an instinct to a lock and key contrivance; the instinct is the lock which encloses the striving force, the stimulus is the key. Turn the key, liberate the energy and the action is sure to follow unless it is prohibited by some external force or some other instinct simultaneously excited. We have thirteen primary instincts with their corresponding affective aspect—the primary emotions. They are the mainspring of all human activity, though they become so obscured by the modifications they undergo that it is hard to detect them in the highest human behavior.

Instinctive behavior may be modified in four ways: 1) the instinctive reaction may become capable of being initiated not only by the perception of the native excitant, but also by the ideas of such objects and by perceptions and ideas of other objects; 2) the bodily movements may be modified and complicated to an indefinitely great degree; 3) the complexity of ideas which bring the human instincts into play, frequently brings it about that several instincts are simultaneously excited, when several processes blend with various degrees of intimacy; 4) the instinctive tendencies become more or less systematically organized about certain objects or ideas. The first two classes are purely conditioned reflexes in which individual processes are modified. The latter two classes are due

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 45-46.

⁶ *Historical Introduction to Psychology*, p. 295.

⁷ *Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 30.

mainly to sentiments, which are the outstanding feature of human behavior.

A sentiment may be defined as "an organized system of emotional tendencies centred about some object." "It is an enduring conative attitude toward an object set up by the experience of the individual,"⁸ merely a complex organization of the primary instinctive impulses about an object or an idea. The outstanding examples of sentiments are our loves and hates; there are three classes according to the objects about which they are centred: concrete particular, concrete general, and the abstract sentiments, e. g., the sentiment of love for a child, love for children in general and the love of justice or virtue. It is the abstract sentiments which are the basis of all moral character and higher human conduct. Sentiments distinguish human from animal behavior, and it is through the sentiments that man becomes capable of moral conduct of the highest kind.

In the advance from purely instinctive behavior to the highest moral conduct there are four stages: 1) instinctive behavior modified only by the influence of pains and pleasures incidentally experienced in the course of instinctive activities; 2) that in which the operation of the instinctive impulses is modified by the influence of rewards and punishments administered more or less systematically by the social environment; 3) that in which conduct is regulated by the anticipation of social praise and blame; 4) the highest stage in which conduct is regulated by an ideal of conduct that enables a man to act in the way which seems to him right regardless of the praise or blame of his social environment. The first two stages are common to men and animals alike and are purely conditioned reflexes. The last two are due to the development of the self-regarding sentiment.

The self-regarding sentiment is the organization of the primary instinctive impulses about the idea of the self; it is the clue to all moral conduct. Into this sentiment has been incorporated by punishment endured in childhood, the instinct of submission or the emotion of negative self-feeling, which enables custom and social tradition to control the impulses of our primary instincts. The self-regarding sentiment, developed, as it is, by our environment, education and disposition, is also the clue to the higher moral conduct of men in which they control the strong impulses of the primary instincts by an ideal of conduct. There seems to enter into such conduct a new force which men have called the will, to give the extra push needed to live up to our ideal of conduct. But no:

"The 'X,' the unknown quantity of which we are here in search, is always an impulse awakened within the self-regarding sentiment. It is the desire that I, the precious self, that being which I conceive proudly or humbly, more or less adequately, more or less truly, more or less clearly, according to the degree of development of my powers, the desire that this self shall realize in action the ideal of conduct which is formulated and accepted."⁹

⁸ *Outline of Psychology*, p. 419.

⁹ *Outline of Psychology*, p. 440.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 441.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 446.

But the self-regarding sentiment is not different from other sentiments. Its striving force is ultimately due to the primary instinctive impulses.

What then is this peculiar, mysterious power which men call the Will?

"The answer is that neither the Will nor Conscience is a faculty, an entity of any kind, distinct from the rest of the personality. The Will is character in action . . . —character in which the moral sentiments are duly incorporated in the system of the sentiments through the medium of the sentiment of self-regard, are given due weight in all moral issues."¹⁰ Is there then such a thing as free will?

"I have made it clear, I hope, that in my view the resolutions of the will are not 'bolts from the blue,' of a nature unconnected with the lower or more primitive functions of the organism . . . Does it then follow that we must accept the deterministic position, must deny completely all freedom of the will . . . ? Or may we believe that the course of things is not strictly determined and predictable and that human decisions are what they seem to be . . . ? To me it seems that all we know of nature and of the human mind justifies the latter alternative."¹¹

Yes, McDougall does incline toward the libertarian view and would like to hold free will. He cannot see that it is logically precluded by his theory of instincts. But alas! he cannot have his cake and eat it; his theory absolutely precludes free will in the traditional meaning of the term. Free will is "that endowment in virtue of which an agent, when all the conditions requisite for the performance of an action are given, can perform the action or abstain from it, can perform this action or that." It means that when all the conditions for action are present we *here and now* determine whether we shall act or not, and in what way we shall act. It means further that we are not determined by any exterior or interior force which necessitates our action. For it matters not whether some outside force or the antecedent conditions of our own nature determine our action, if it be determined we are not free. Now an instinctive action is not of such a nature, it is determined from its very nature to act when the stimulus is present. Show the dog food and if he is hungry he must eat, for "he just likes it" and "can't help it." Turn the key and the lock is sure to open. If all our actions are ultimately due to instinctive impulses which are determined to act in a definite manner, then all the actions which follow are determined. If I knew with certitude the exact striving force of the various instincts and sentiments aroused at any given moment, I could foretell the outcome of the issue with certitude. But it is of the very essence of free will that no one can foretell the outcome of the issue with certitude, but only with probability. There is no place in such a system for free will. It is purely a matter of a complex parallelogram of forces—the instinctive forces at the moment aroused. We are irrevocably determined here and now to act according to the manner in which we have

developed our native instinctive dispositions due to environment and education; we are determined by our inner nature, the antecedent conditions of the present action, and to say that we are determined by the antecedent conditions of our nature and yet are free is to be guilty of a contradiction.

That I may not seem to have misinterpreted McDougall's theory or not to have given it due consideration, let me quote the opinions of three other critics of the theory. Knight Dunlap says of him:

"Yet here, as in previous writings, McDougall absolutely refrains from committing himself to any theory which is not as truly mechanistic as those of the cruder radicals."¹²

Harvey Wickham has written of the theory of instincts:

"Instead of being free, we have now thirteen masters, always wrangling among themselves, it is true, but never consulting us about their decisions. If we hesitate to obey one of them it is only because some other happens at the moment to be the

stronger. Or we are mastered by a combination (he refers here to the sentiments), if we decide to move from the city to the country, it is probably a farm bloc. According to this theory, a sufficiently knowing person could calculate your conduct in advance."¹³

C. E. M. Joad says of McDougall:

"It seems to follow that we are not responsible for what we do. We are determined, in short, not by forces external to ourselves, but by forces and impulses—call them instincts, desires, or what you will—that lie deep down at the well-spring of our nature. This may seem to many a less humiliating belief than that of nineteenth century materialists, but it is not free will. What is more, it effectively precludes free will."¹⁴

¹² Knight Dunlap, "American Journal of Psychology," vol. 38, 1927, p. 457.

¹³ Harvey Wickham, "Misbehaviorists," p. 69.

¹⁴ C. E. M. Joad, "Harpers," Aug. 1927, The End of Ethics.

THE FUTURE OF HUMANISM

EDWARD DRUMMOND,

St. Louis University

Although humanism has leaped into prominence only during the last few years, it is not quite correct to regard it as a sudden dawn which has lately broken upon the literary and philosophical world. It did not come with one swift flash of light. The dawn of a period of sanity broke slowly. More than twenty years ago Irving Babbitt had already written two books on humanism: *Literature and the American College*, and *The New Laocoon*. It was then that humanism first raised its head above the ground. It grew slowly, nourished by the thoughtful writings of Babbitt and More, but it was no feeble plant for its roots struck deep.

By 1915 this humanistic tendency could be noted in the critical attitude adopted by some literateurs. But American letters could not yet hail the dawn. They had first to pass through the ultimate stages of Romanticism. The unbounded individual expansiveness and sensationalistic literature which mark the carrying out of Romantic principles to their logical conclusions had yet to put their seal upon them. Expansiveness, radicalism, literary socialism, all these had to be undergone. The post-war days gave the radicals their laboratory, modern philosophy gave them their instruments, and our American artists set to work.

To prepare for our literary Twenties conservatism had to be undermined, for conservatism would be an obstacle to artistry. The world had to be made safe for Bohemianism and, about 1915 a trio of radicals, Mencken, Bourne, and Van Wyck Brooks, set to work to prepare the stage for the men who would come in 1920. In summing up

the work of these three, Seward Collins, editor of the Bookman, writes:

"We have looked down from the apparently lofty height of common sense and have seen H. L. Mencken circling in the dingy, stuffy little province of ideas where a man is considered intellectually incompetent if he is educated, where Friedrich Nietzsche is counted a master of wisdom, where respectability is a badge of shame. We have seen Randolph Bourne still caught at the end of his short life in that pretty, petty web of fevered adolescence in which the great issue is the assault of Radiant Youth on Crabbed Age, where Maeterlinck and Dewey are considered sages, where the pseudo-humanities of sociology and psychology are put above the true humanities. We have seen Van Wyck Brooks morosely spinning out similar obsessions into complex skeins of garbled history, synthetic psychology, preposterous theory and blank nonsense."¹

Thus did these earnest radicals stamp out humanism and prepare the way for our Nineteen Twenties. With the literary fashion set by magazines such as the *Seven Arts*, the *Dial*, the *New Republic*, the *Smart Set*, the old conservatism was utterly out of date, and the success of the literary revolt established. Having apparently conquered, the liberals could afford to be liberal and remark condescendingly of the humanists, "They (Babbitt and More) were able men, but they had nothing to say to the men of today."

With Bohemianism in the dictator's chair, utter freedom was the policy of the decade that now ensued. Flaming youth was preached by Mencken, Anderson, Cabell, Dreiser and all the rest. With scientific clap-trap in the way of complexes, inhibitions, psycho-analyses, and deterministic behaviorism to back them up, these artists

¹ Collins, C. Bookman, June, 1930, p. 354.

deemed the sky the limit and strove to reach it by grubbing in the mud.

In 1921 Paul Elmer More published his *Religion of Plato* and in 1923 his *Hellenistic Philosophies*; in the following year Babbitt gave his *Democracy and Leadership* to the public. These volumes coming into an environment so utterly confident and sure of itself provoked scant attention. Humanism was killed by 1920 and could never come to life: so the radicals thought. But a study of these same volumes would have shown that humanism was not dead but waiting for the spring. A dam had been thrown across the stream of literature and the stream was rapidly becoming a stagnant pool. But water was trickling under the dam, and when the spring and the reawakening came the dam might break.

In 1928 the first signs of spring and the reawakening could be seen. *The Forum*, always in the market for controversies, published some articles of More, Babbitt, T. S. Eliot and Michael Williams, and afforded to Humanism its journalistic first opening since 1918. Now ten years is a long time and the generation of literateurs which had grown up in the decade of revolt had never heard of humanism. Among them these first articles failed to excite much interest. They did not realize that the call to arms was being sounded. But gradually the humanistic movement gathered force. Replies to these early articles began drifting in. Others took up the cry and by the spring of 1929 the real power of humanism was making itself felt. Edmund Wilson in *The New Republic* strove hard in working up a counter attack. Mencken gleefully turned to his armory and rubbed his hands at the thought of a literary free-for-all.

Humanism continued its growth. By the autumn of 1929 the critics knew that it was preparing a strong offensive drive. Norman Foerster was collecting material for his symposium, and early in the spring of 1930, Mencken's hopes for literary pitched battles were realized. The hand to hand conflict was on, and the blows began to fall. Robert Shaefer in two essays, *Humanism and Impudence* and *Farewell to the Twenties* gave many an anti-humanist pause, for he was a man who could translate the ideas of More and Babbitt into a language that no Bohemian could fail to understand.

Then at the opportune moment came the volume Foerster had been editing, *Humanism and America*. This book contained a number of essays written by humanists, and these essays covered the majority of the most mooted literary questions of the hour. It did not pass the anti-humanist reviewers unchallenged. They seized upon it and strove to tear it into a thousand pieces. A word or a phrase was sufficient to send many a reviewer upon a frenzied verbal flight that might last for pages. Mere condemnatory reviews, however, were deemed insufficient. Feeling that something more positive had to be done to ward off the effects of this effort of humanism, Mr. Grattan decided that he too would edit a symposium. He would produce a volume of anti-humanistic essays which

would draw the teeth from Foerster's book. It was advertised as, "The challenge of the creative life to the Schoolmen of our day."

Some of these essays were thoughtful and well written, others were not. Since it would take too long to deal in detail with them we shall mention one of the main ideas behind the whole symposium: the revival of what Mr. Collins calls the anti-humanistic myth, according to which, as Mr. Collins explains it, humanism is opposed to modern letters as the critical is opposed to the creative, as the repressive to the liberating, as the intellectual to the emotional, as the old to the new, as the cold to the warm, as business to art, as dogma to choice, as reaction to progress and so on ad infinitum.² The myth is constructed of tags and catch phrases; is a mixture of captious facts, half truths and things that are not true in any sense. The greatest merit of this book is, perhaps, that it will give the future an adequate cross section of the 'Twenties and mark the low water line of American criticism.

As we look back over the period from 1928 to 1931 and examine the criticisms preferred by the anti-humanists some points may strike us queerly. That some of them appear to us as high laudations, although they were meant to be condemnations, is a strong indication that criticism in America had strayed very far indeed. Humanists are called the modern Schoolmen, a black phrase, indeed, when it issues from the mouth of a modern. They are accused of failing to be modern merely because they do not swallow in one gulp all that so-called science feeds them, because they are not behaviorists, determinists and monists. They are condemned because they do not worship sex appeal but believe in chastity. They are charged with being theists, even Christians and of tending towards Roman Catholicism.

The symposia gotten out by Foerster and Grattan are the two great offensives in the battle thus far. The attack on both sides has somewhat died down since the summer of 1930 and both sides are digging in, preparing for the coming campaign. The controversy, which was accorded so much publicity, has made an impression on many who do not belong to the inner literary circles. It has affected not only the world of letters but the realms of philosophy as well, and the anti-humanists are beginning to realize what their opponents have always realized, that this is a battle which, though it began in the field of literature, is going to be fought out on philosophical grounds. Imbued with a growing and healthy scepticism towards the scientific dogmas of today men are critically examining the principles on which our modern life is based. And this critical examination of principles, this effort to find a philosophy which really fits the facts of life, is one of the best effects that the controversy has produced.

Such is the present position of humanism. Strongly before the minds of the thoughtful public, it has gained

² Collins, S., *Criticism in America*, Bookman, June, 1930, p. 243.

much ground and holds it tenaciously. But its present position cannot be permanent for it holds a middle ground. It must move forward and conquer or retreat and be doomed. Will it move forward and become the spirit behind the next literary age? As Mr. Munson puts the question and its answer:

"Have they (the humanists) the potency to initiate a real transformation of modern society? Can they even arrest its downward plunge let alone reverse its direction? . . . The only thing that can be said is that the traditionalist thinkers are making a supremely important contribution to the thought of today, that by their contribution they tend to improve the general intellectual situation . . ." ³

We go further than Munson and offer as our opinion that the humanistic movement will guide the next literary age. The following facts can be mustered up as lending weight to this view.

Romanticism has been the guiding spirit of the world for a century and a half. (By Romanticism we mean, in the word of Maritain, "that religious eviction of reason and its works, the sacred unbridling of sensation, the holy parade of self and the adoration of primitive natural instinct, pantheism as theology and an emotional stimulus as a rule of life.")⁴ But the romantic spirit has gone through all its phases. The pendulum of Romanticism has swung from Rousseau, "the angel of nature," through the phase of soft lyricism of Wordsworth, to the pantheism of Shelly; from pantheism to the scientific materialism of Huxley and Darwin, from science to twentieth century sensationalism and radicalism. Romanticism has swept through its complete arc. It must stop for it can go no further.

Furthermore when one looks abroad for indications of the new spirit, signs are not wanting. France, which sets the literary modes and fashions a generation before they reach the rest of the world, is turning humanistic. Her literature and philosophy are shaping themselves according to humanistic standards as fast as the logical French mind can fashion the moulds.⁵ The day of French Bohemianism is gone and a new day of classicism has dawned. In France the classists or traditionalists or humanists, though roughly divided into three groups are united in their opposition to Romanticism and all her offspring. There is the group associated with the *Action Française* with Charles Maurras as their leader, an agnostic who finds he has more in common with Catholics than with Protestants or atheists. There is the neo-Thomistic group with Jacques Maritain at their head, scholastic philosophers who are offering for modern problems the solutions of St. Thomas. The third group comprises men like Benda who are humanists mainly in their opposition to radicalism.

³ Munson, G., *The Dilemma of the Liberated*, p. 104.

⁴ Maritain, J., *The Three Reformers*, p. 115.

⁵ Mr. B. Massey has written pertinently on this phase of the French classic revival in his *French Renaissance of Catholic Literature*; *America*, Feb. 21, 1931.

In England humanistic tendencies are more than merely manifesting themselves. T. S. Eliot and his co-worker Herbert Read, are both strong champions of orthodoxy. Wyndham Lewis is utterly opposed to such philosophers as Bergson, Whitehead and Alexander. Hilaire Belloc in his battles against naturalism, and scientific monism, and in his championing of classicism, has much in common with the humanists. Chesterton, while he doubts "if humanism can be a complete substitute for superhumanism," has much praise for the new movement, and is himself humanistic in his championing of the classic traditions, of common sense and orthodoxy.

In America the spirit of the country favors the movement. The United States favors the revolutionary, because a revolution gave her birth. But radicalism has been in power so long that it is no longer radical. As Babbitt remarked:

"One should not rest content until one has, with the aid of the secular experience of both East and West, worked out a point of view, so modern that compared with it, our smart young radicals will seem antediluvian."⁶

When Americans come to realize that besides being outworn, radicalism is wrong in the bargain, the success of the humanistic revolt is assured.

Assuming that the humanistic spirit will not only leaven but also guide our next literary age, all has not yet been said concerning the future of humanism. The most important question remains, how will humanism develop? Once the humanistic position becomes fairly secure, a period of intellectualism will certainly ensue. It will be a period of thoughts rather than feelings; ideas rather than emotions; the critic rather than the artist will be the man of the day. It will be the reaction after one hundred and fifty years of Romanticism, and will furnish the mental discipline which must precede the age of artistic production. And after such a literary decade as we have passed, this intellectual disciplining is certainly necessary.

Following this period of intellectualism will come the productive phase of humanism. With its advent will come the crisis in the development of the humanistic movement. Up to it the classic revival will have followed one main path, but when it is reached the new classicism will have come to the cross roads. One path will be that of a pagan humanism in which the history of the fifteenth and sixteenth century can be repeated. The other will be the path of Christian humanism along which the Renaissance of history might have travelled if scholastic philosophy had not been dead.

Along which of these two lines will modern humanism develop? It is not at all impossible for it to follow the paganistic path. The inner control of Babbitt can base itself, temporarily at least, on nothing higher than a desire for natural harmony. It can result in the control of the Stoic or in the categorical imperative of Kant. Free will,

⁶ Babbitt, Irving, Rousseau and Romanticism.

the keystone of humanism, will offer no obstacle if the new classicism chooses the wrong path. The other principles of this movement, so far as these principles are announced at present, would not check this new renaissance in the event it should go astray.

Humanism must, then, do two things. It must conquer naturalism and it must go forward to a Christian renaissance. Herein lies the scholastic opportunity. As Mr. Morrison pointed out in his *A Philosophy for the Humanist*,

"Pure philosophy is the artillery imperatively needed by the humanists in their crisis, and unless they get it their movement, the most promising in modern American thought, will be stopped dead. . . . Is it artillery the humanists need? They know where they can get it. The heavy metal of the German 'Big Berthas' wrought no greater havoc on the masonry of Antwerp and Liege than have the scholastic arguments when brought to play upon the defenses of naturalism."⁷

The scholastic can offer the humanists the philosophic timber necessary to strengthen his dualistic position. The scholastic can offer an inner check stronger than the "ought to be" of the Kantian or Stoic. By attacking the modern problems all about them, by giving answers to those problems that the modern can understand, by translating their philosophy into the language and modes of thought of today, the scholastic philosophers of this country can imitate their fellow workers in France and England. Scholastic philosophers have long demanded a hearing; they have the audience now if they but realize the fact.

Humanism offers scholastics an entering wedge in their attack upon the false philosophies of the moderns. It is the new radicalism, and in this revolutionary movement against the dogmas of the moderns the scholastics can play a prominent part. But revolutions, they must remember, are won by action and not by watchful waiting.

⁷ Morrison, Howard, *The Modern Schoolman*, Mar., 1931, pp. 46 and 55.

PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT MAN

Continued from page 64

losophers have proceeded in their consideration of human nature very much in the spirit of Diogenes when strutting about the crowded market place with a lantern in full daylight he went looking for a man. May it not be that in dealing with the false starts made by Descartes, Locke, and Hume, *et alii*, we have overlooked the influence of Montaigne? As against him, Socrates' saying, know thyself, still holds good, but could prove effective only when supplemented by humility; not the hypocritical humility of a Uriah Heep, or even of Pascal, but that of St. Augustine, who in the following passage from the *Confessions* gives the true answer to the very insidious, because latent and unacknowledged, difficulty with which modern philosophical thought is confronted. Dealing with the problem in the language of faith, St. Augustine solved it philosophically in the following words:

Lord, to Thee, the Creator and Governor of the universe, most excellent and most good, thanks were due to Thee our God, even hadst Thou destined for me boyhood only. For even then I was, I lived, and felt; and had an implanted providence over my own well-being—a trace of that mysterious Unity, whence I was derived;—I guarded by the inward sense the entireness of my senses, and in these minute pursuits, and in my thoughts on things minute, I learnt to delight in truth, I hated to be deceived, had a vigorous memory, was gifted with speech, was soothed by friendship, avoided pain, baseness, ignorance. In so small a creature, what was not wonderful, not admirable? But all are gifts of my God; it was not I, who gave them me; and good these are, and these together are myself. Good, then, is He that made me, and He is my good; and before Him will I exult for every good which as a boy I had. For it was my sin, that not in Him, but in His creatures—myself and others—I sought for pleasures, sublimities, truths, and so fell headlong into sorrows, confusions, errors. Thanks be to Thee, my joy and my glory and my confidence, my God, thanks be to Thee, for Thy gifts, but do Thou preserve them to me. For so wilt Thou preserve me, and those things shall be enlarged and perfected, which Thou hast given me, and I myself shall be with Thee, since even to be Thou hast given me.

BOOK REVIEWS

SCHOLASTIC METAPHYSICS

By John F. McCormick, S. J.,

Part II, Natural Theology.

Chicago, Loyola University Press, 1931, \$2

In this book we have the second part of Father McCormick's metaphysics for college students. In the first part the author treats of the metaphysics of being or reality in general; dealing with ideas, principles, reasonings and conclusions that hold for all beings as beings. In this general treatment we discover that the beings of this visible universe are beings derived and contingent. They owe their existence to a being underived, uncaused, absolutely necessary. To define and distinguish this being from all others, to prove its existence beyond all doubt, to determine its nature, to derive its properties or attributes from

its nature, to show complete dependence of all other beings on this necessary being for their existence, their permanence, their activities—is what the author undertakes and accomplishes in this second volume. This necessary being is God Himself, shown to be the Creator, Conserver and Ruler of the whole cosmos and of all its parts down to the very smallest.

This treatise on God is called Theodicy or Natural Theology. It is the highest and noblest department of the whole system of Scholastic philosophy. The master minds through all the ages have delighted to give themselves to this study of God as knowable through the light of reason. They have devoted to this study all the powers of their penetrating genius and have bequeathed to us a scientific body of knowledge about the supreme Being who is the ultimate, efficient exemplar and final cause of all that is,—a body of knowledge unequalled for its

power, its depth, and its capacity to satisfy and elevate the inquiring mind.

It is a pleasure to note that Father McCormick has given us a book which presents the substance, pure and undiluted, of this sublime work of the great scholastics. The scale on which this doctrine is offered by an author does and should depend on the character of those for whom it is mainly intended. The author intends his book to meet the needs of the college student; and he keeps in mind the needs, the capacities and the opportunities of present-day students for this particular study.

We are glad to note that the author's idea of the capacities of our college students is encouraging. His book is not a primer. He gives us a book that includes all the great questions belonging to his subject and the treatment of these questions is by no means superficial. He can afford to be large, and go deep, because he is clear, natural, orderly, logical. His method of presentation makes it easy to follow and understand, and is furthermore calculated to arouse enthusiasm in the pupils. Clarity is always interesting.

The book, of course, is written in English—most text-books on the subject are in Latin. Besides, the *substance* not the *form* of the scholastic teaching is closely adhered to. Presumably Father McCormick has learned by experience that the modern student and the modern methods of teaching have begotten a dislike for rigorous scholastic syllogistic form.

The study of Theodicy, always interesting and always ennobling, is in our day extremely necessary. Atheists are publishing books in which the existence of God is denied. Agnostics are proclaiming from the housetops that if there is a God we can know nothing about Him. Sentimentalists and Modernists say we will still believe in God but we cannot really know Him. Naturalists explain the universe without either affirming or denying the existence of God. God, if not driven out, is ignored in His own universe. Evolutionists and a host of other unclassifiable writers are utterly perverting the very concept of God, so that neither themselves or anybody else can tell what they mean by the word God. All these trends of thought find their way from books and universities into poetry, fiction, magazine articles and even into the columns of our daily papers. Speaking generally, outside the Catholic Church theism is an ebbing and atheism a rapidly rising tide. There is very serious danger that our young Catholics may be imperceptibly affected by these almost unescapable influences.

Our Catholic college students should not only be protected from such dangers but so fortified as to wage effective warfare against them. We must organize an army of crusaders to do battle against the enemies of God. Father McCormick's book will give much of the equipment needed. It should be in the hands of every Catholic student of philosophy in all our colleges. We imagine there is little need of exhortation on this subject. Our Catholic teachers have felt the need of a book like this. We feel sure they will eagerly adopt it when its merits are brought to their notice. In fact all schools where the doctrine of Christian Theism is still taught would be likely to welcome the strong unwavering aid a book like this would bring them.

MICHAEL I. STRITCH.

THE RELIGION OF PLATO

By Paul Elmer More,

Volume 1 of THE GREEK TRADITION
2nd Edition

Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1928, \$3.50

This volume treats the religion of Plato as part of a great spiritual movement embodied in Greek literature, philosophic and religious, pagan and Christian, from Plato to the Council of Chalcedon (451 A. D.). Mr. More's thesis is that this "Greek Tradition" lies behind all western philosophy and religion.

"This movement," he states, "despite large importations from without, was essentially a product of the Hellenic mind."

To the Scholastic reader the work affords a goodly measure of satisfaction. Mr. More, like Plato whom he has studied so profoundly, firmly holds many of the doctrines which the schoolmen ever regarded as the fundamentals of philosophy. Consequently his book gives assurance that those better days are approaching when Scholastics and non-Scholastics can meet with common grounds for discussion, and in this clearing house of thought work at their problems, chat away their differences, and win a fuller knowledge of the spiritual and material universe, the reality about them.

To the more advanced student of Scholasticism who is acquainted with Plato's work, and who is able to read discriminatingly, the book is indeed valuable.

In addition to its other fine qualities, the volume is a splendid anthology of Platonism. It contains translations of passages from Plato on the existence, nature and providence of God, on the soul and its properties, on the natural law, on time, on space, on the Intelligent Cause required for an explanation of the order in the universe. To evaluate the author's single interpretations of Plato would require more space than is permitted here. On the whole they bespeak common sense, and are prudently independent of the Hegelianism tainting most of the British and German Platonists.

Yet the Scholastic is not likely to give the book his unqualified approval. Some of its details disappoint him. At times Mr. More is obscure. Often he draws or seems to draw unwarranted inferences, and at times he is apt to provoke unfavorable judgments, although a closer scrutiny of the passage usually modifies them. For example, if by his thesis Mr. More means (as many readers will interpret) that the essential element in the driving force behind western culture is Greek philosophy, and that Christian doctrine is the accidental reinforcing element, historians trained in Scholasticism will object on Mr. More's own grounds. For in the forces which shaped western civilization the student sees at least as much the influence of Christian doctrine, the supernatural, as of Greek philosophy, the natural, which Providence used as the means to spread Christianity. Then, too, the manner in which some issues are left open may irritate the Scholastic. For the Scholastic, convinced that he possesses the heritage of Plato's material, synthesized, stripped of inconsistencies and errors by the long labors of Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Kleutgen and Mercier, objects to the implication that because Platonism does not yield satisfying solutions to some problems, these problems are insoluble. And since the Scholastic further holds that clear concepts of the nature and attributes of God and the soul can be obtained only by demonstration, he is sorry that Mr. More seems to include Aristotelian mediate inference within the scope of the horror he has conceived for German metaphysics.

Nonetheless we can cordially indorse this volume (although it should be recommended only with caution to unformed and indiscriminating readers). With Mr. More, we hope his work will prove an aid to the many—especially those generous youths not yet befogged by the confusion of Monism—still seeking a satisfactory philosophy for the guidance of their lives. If the study of Platonism will aid Americans (as it has many Europeans) to become interested in the dualism of spirit and matter, the existence of God, the spirituality and immortality of the soul, the freedom of the will, the control of the intellect and will exercised upon the passions, a life in accord with the precepts of the natural law; if moreover it will make men like to Mr. More, a sincere seeker for truth and unafraid to change an opinion on more mature thought, then we wish to join our voices with the wide praise this book is receiving. May the author, his aims and his work prosper.

GEORGE E. GANSS.

**"LARGE
Enough
To Serve Any «
STRONG
Enough
To Protect All"**

Offering every financial service, including trusteeship, executorship, investment service, and the financing of church, school and hospital buildings on first mortgage.

**Mercantile-
Commerce
Bank and Trust Co.
Locust ~ Eighth ~ St. Charles
St. Louis**

A MONUMENT TO SAINT AUGUSTINE

By M. C. D'Arcy, Maurice Blondel, Christopher Dawson, Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, C. C. Martindale, S. J., Erich Przywara, S. J., John-Baptist Reeves, O. P., B. Roland-Gosselin, E. I. Watkin. (Printed in Great Britain.) New York. Lincoln MacVeagh: The Dial Press, 1930, \$5.

The Sack of Rome so roused the great mind of Augustine that he became the pivot around which Western civilization swung from its ancient to its modern course. His "City of God", written to save men from despair over the ruin of the old order, made intelligible the upheavals and cataclysms that beset the human race. They are a castigation for the vices of the past and a purification for the future. This maxim, taken together with the Christian's twofold citizenship, refuted both the paginizers and the chiliasts. But much more than this is contained in the *Monument*. We see how Augustine was a master of both prayer and argument; how philosophy in his day was not *scientia* but *sapientia*, a way of life; how the sum of human knowledge was *in globo*, not sorted out into coldly exclusive classes as we have it today. Yet St. Augustine is put before us as the first Scholastic, the first modern, the first Christian humanist, the one who taught literature to smile through its tears; as a philosopher whose basic principle is that truth is found, not made; a philosopher whose cold reason must first know before it can believe, yet is unable really to understand until it allies itself with faith.

But why has not some one of these ten writers brought out, that, in Augustine's *Credo ut intelligam*, the *ut* primarily expresses a consequence? Once true understanding has been experienced as the *result* of faith (and that was Augustine's experience), it is perfectly reasonable, after that, to make the *ut* one of purpose. (Many another convert has found, as Michael Williams engagingly admits, that countless learned difficulties vanish in acting on even the rudimentary faith requisite for confession). With Augustine wisdom was experiential and purposive; knowledge for knowledge's sake he avoided as miserly greed for mere gold. His philosophy was supernaturalized pragmatism (cf. p. 206), lifting him to the heights of mysticism. That an equally great mystic, St. Thomas, should have so resolutely hid his own spiritual experiences from the eyes of his readers only shows how grown-up and reserved philosophy had become by that time. In ethics Augustine established the fact of obligation, which had baffled Plato and which Kant was to leave suspended in mid-air. Cautiously, too, does he avoid the pitfalls that have swallowed Descartes, Malebranche, Hegel and Kierkegaard, nor does he allow his mathematic or his dynamic cast of mind to take him wholly captive after the manner of many modern partial philosophers.

All the essays in this book make engrossing reading and are not too difficult, except perhaps one translation of an article in the "klar-obscur" German style now so much in vogue. Students will be grateful for the generous index, though not many American readers will fancy the favorite European ritual of the paper-knife necessitated by the uncut pages of the new book. In other respects the British printer has done his work well.

J. A. MCWILLIAMS.

FOR NEXT YEAR'S SENIOR CLASS

Four Issues
The Modern Schoolman
\$1.00

FOR THIS YEAR'S COLLEGE GRAD

LOYOLA University

CHICAGO

Conducted
by the
Jesuits

Arts and Sciences	6525 Sheridan Rd.
Downtown College	28 N. Franklin St.
Sociology	28 N. Franklin St.
Commerce (Day School)	6525 Sheridan Rd.
Commerce (Evening School)	28 N. Franklin St.
Dentistry	1757 W. Harrison St.
Graduate School	28 N. Franklin St.
Home Study	6525 Sheridan Rd.
Law (Day and Evening Schools)	28 N. Franklin St.
Medicine	706 S. Lincoln St.

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY

ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI

Includes the following Schools and Colleges and Affiliated Institutions

THE SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES

College of Arts and Sciences	221 North Grand Blvd.
College of Arts and Sciences at Florissant	Florissant, Mo.
Graduate School	15 North Grand Blvd.
School of Divinity	3635 West Pine Blvd.
School of Medicine	1402 S. Grand Blvd.
School of Law	3642 Lindell Blvd.
School of Philosophy and Science	3638 Lindell Blvd.
School of Dentistry	3556 Caroline Street
School of Commerce and Finance	3666 Lindell Blvd.
(New building under construction.)	
School of Education	15 North Grand Blvd.
School of Sociology	203 North Grand Blvd.
School of Nursing, Administrative Office	1402 South Grand Blvd.

THE CORPORATE COLLEGES

Fontbonne College	Wydown and Big Bend Blvd.
Maryville College	Meramec and Nebraska Avenues
Webster College	Lockwood Blvd., Webster Groves, Missouri
Maryhurst Normal	Denny Road, Kirkwood, Missouri
Notre Dame Junior College	Ripa Avenue, South Saint Louis
Saint Mary's Junior College	O'Fallon, Missouri

WHITE HOUSE

St. Louis House of Retreats—
White House, Jefferson Barracks P. O., Missouri

THE HOSPITALS

1. UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL
 - (a) St. Mary's Hospital—Clayton and Bellevue Avenues
 - (b) St. Mary's Infirmary.....1536 Papin Street
 - (c) Firmin Desloge Hospital.....1327 South Grand Blvd.
(Under construction)
 - (d) Mt. St. Rose Sanatorium.....9101 South Broadway
2. AFFILIATED HOSPITALS
 - (a) Alexian Brothers' Hospital.....3933 South Broadway
 - (b) St. Anthony's Hospital.....Grand Blvd. and Chippewa
 - (c) St. John's Hospital.....307 South Euclid Avenue
3. STAFF-RELATED HOSPITALS
 - (a) St. Louis City Hospital, Unit I.....1550 Lafayette Ave.
 - (b) St. Louis City Hospital, Unit II.....2945 Lawton Ave.
 - (c) St. Louis Isolation Hospital.....5800 Arsenal Street
 - (d) St. Ann's Maternity Hospital.....Page and Union Blvds.

THE NURSING SCHOOL

1. St. Mary's Hospital Unit.....1101 Bellevue Avenue
2. Alexian Brothers' Hospital Unit.....3933 South Broadway
3. St. John's Hospital Unit.....4961 Audubon Avenue

THE DISPENSARIES

Saint Mary's Dispensary (University Dispensary) —	
	1509 Chouteau Avenue
Alexian Brothers' Dispensary	3933 South Broadway
Saint John's Dispensary	312 North 23rd Street
Saint Louis Obstetrical Dispensary	3245 Lafayette Avenue
Saint Louis City Hospital Dispensary	1550 Lafayette Avenue

GENERAL ETHICS — SPECIAL ETHICS

Outline of Lectures on Ethics

By

REV. JOSEPH F. SULLIVAN, S. J.

Professor of Ethics, Holy Cross College, Worcester, Mass.

A Text Book Suitable for Classes in Ethics

Now being used in the following colleges and universities:

Fordham University, Fordham, N. Y.
Georgetown University, Washington, D. C.
Canisius College, Buffalo, N. Y.
Holy Cross College, Worcester, Mass.
Boston College Graduate School, Boston, Mass.
University of Detroit, Detroit, Michigan.
Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois.
St. Louis University, St. Louis, Missouri.
Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska.
Loyola College, Montreal, Canada.
Loyola University, Venice, California.
Spring Hill College, Mobile, Alabama.
St. John's University, Collegeville, Minn.
Georgetown Visitation Convent, Washington, D. C.
Duchesne College, Omaha, Nebraska.
St. Mary's College, St. Marys, Kansas.
St. Elizabeth's College, Convent Station, N. J.

"It is well that the author is making these volumes, published originally as a digest of lectures for students of philosophy at Holy Cross College, accessible to a larger reading public."

—America.

"The type and arrangement are excellent and should recommend themselves to students in preference to our present works."

—Modern Schoolman, May, 1930.

"I am finding it very satisfactory and the students are finding it very interesting."

S. J. RUEVE, S. J.,
Professor of Ethics, Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska.

"I hope that your books will enjoy the wide popularity which they merit."

JOSEPH T. KELLY, S. T. D.,
Professor of Ethics, College of St. Rose, Albany, N. Y., and
Vice-Chancellor of the Albany Diocese, Albany, N. Y.

General Ethics \$2.00 - - Special Ethics \$2.00 - - 25% Discount to Colleges

HOLY CROSS COLLEGE PRESS, Worcester, Mass.

For Convenience and Comfort in St. Louis

THE NEW HOTEL MELBOURNE

GRAND AND LINDELL BOULEVARDS

Directly Across the Street from St. Louis University and the College Church — Only a Few Blocks from the New Cathedral

From \$2.50

Beautiful New Lounge and Private
Dining Rooms

Garage in Connection

Excellent Food Served at Moderate Prices
in Our Coffee Shop and Dining Room

O. P. Greathouse, Manager

Special Rates to Ordination Visitors

400 Rooms with Bath

